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Triadic social games are interesting from a cognitive perspective because 
they require a high degree of mutual social awareness. They consist of 
two agents incorporating an object in turn-taking sequences and require 
individuals to coordinate their attention to the task, the object, and to one 
another. Social games are observed commonly in domesticated dogs 
interacting with humans, but they have received only little empirical 
attention in nonhuman primates. Here, we report observations of 
bonobos (Pan paniscus) engaging in social games with a human playmate. 
Our behavioral analyses revealed that the bonobos behaved in many ways 
similar to human children during these games. They were interested in 
the joint activity, rather than the play objects themselves, and used 
communicative gestures to encourage reluctant partners to perform their 
role, suggesting rudimentary understanding of others’ intentions. Our 
observations thus may imply that shared intentionality, the ability 
to understand and shares intention with other individuals, has emerged 
in the primate lineage before the origins of hominids. 
Key words: Pan paniscus; social games; social intelligence; cooperation;
cognitive evolution
INTRODUCTION
From early childhood, human infants interact with others dyadically in
coordinated turn-taking play sequences, so-called social games [Trevarthen,
1979]. As objects are integrated, these games become more complex and triadic,
requiring coordination of attention both to a task and object and to one another
[Ratner & Bruner, 1978]. Triadic games have also been documented in
interactions between dogs and humans [e.g. Mitchell & Thompson, 1993],
humans and dolphins [Kuczaj & Highfill, 2005], and between dolphins [McBride
& Hebb, 1948]. In contrast, social games in nonhuman primates (hereafter
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primates) are almost always dyadic, rarely involve objects, and if so usually in a
competitive way [Pellegrini & Smith, 2005]. Apes sometimes show triadic
engagement, but these interactions appear different from those observed in
children, especially with regard to joint attentional episodes [e.g. Tomasello et al.,
2005]. Consistent with this view are recent results by Warneken et al. [2006], who
compared the cooperative skills of children and human-raised chimpanzees in two
problem-solving tasks and two triadic social games. In the social games, the adult
human partner was instructed to suddenly stop participating to provoke the
subject into responding in ways that might reveal their understanding of the
cooperative nature of these games and the roles required. Although most children
tried to encourage the human playmate to resume his role by using
communicative signals, this was never observed in the chimpanzees. One
interpretation of these results is that primates may be interested in achieving
individual goals, whereas children are also capable of pursuing shared goals
[Warneken et al., 2006]. It has been argued that such observations provide
evidence for what might be a uniquely human form of social intelligence
[Tomasello et al., 2005], the ability to share intentions [Bratman, 1992; Gilbert,
1989]. Shared intentionality refers to collaborative interactions in which
participants (1) are mutually responsive to one another, (2) pursue a shared
goal, (3) and coordinate their plans of action for pursuing the shared goal
[Bratman, 1992; Gilbert, 1989].
Here, we report observations of four bonobos (Pan paniscus), who engaged
spontaneously in different types of triadic social games with human playmates. In
line with previous methodology [Ross & Lollis, 1987], we deliberately interrupted
these games to investigate if the bonobos encouraged the recalcitrant partner to
perform her role by using communicative gestures.
METHODS
Study Site
The sanctuary Lola ya bonobo houses about 50 wild born individuals of all
age–sex classes in four enclosures, containing natural forests, water basins, and
numerous objects (e.g. balls). The two enclosures concerned in this study were 14
and 10 hectares woodland areas, which included 12 and 13 individuals, respectively.
Participants and Data Collection
Observations took place during February–April 2006, for 6–7 days a week, for
about 6–8 hr per day. Social games were initiated between three humans (SP, AK,
and CP) and four bonobos: KD and ML (infants), LS (subadult female), and KW
(adolescent male). In each case the human playmate tried to instigate a social
game involving various objects on an ad libitum basis. Once a triadic interaction
was established and was relatively stable, the human playmate suddenly and
deliberately stopped the interaction. Interactions were filmed using a digital
camcorder (Panasonic NV-GS 250). We recorded the number of gestural signals
that individuals produced before and after the interruption. We defined gestures
as expressive movements of limbs or head or body postures directed towards
a recipient in a goal-directed and mechanically ineffective way, receiving
a voluntary response [Pika, in press]. Gestures were coded as intentionally
produced, if accompanied by eye contact and/or waiting after signal production,
expecting a response [Pika, in press].
Table I lists the different gestures considered for this study.
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Data Analysis
SP coded all gestures from videotapes. About 10% of all videotapes were recoded
by a second observer. There was 80.0% agreement between coders concerning
classification of gestures, using a Cohen’s k reliability test [Altmann, 1991].
RESULTS
We observed four different triadic social games with four different bonobos
interacting with a human playmate. When a game was deliberately interrupted
(only the object splash game stopped naturally), individuals reliably produced
gestures in an attempt to reengage the reluctant partner. All the observed
gestures were part of the bonobos’ natural repertoire [Pika et al., 2005].
Social Game 1, ‘‘Hand-Splash’’
This game was observed on 2 different days with the two infants. KD, sitting
alone in the waterbasin, initiated the first game by splashing water with his legs.
SP also splashed water, using her hand as the object of play. In response, KD
approached SP, sat down next to her, whereas SP continued splashing more
water. Then she abruptly stopped the game, leaving her hand in the water. KD
responded by grabbing and touching her hand. SP splashed more water and then
stopped the game for a second time, this time taking her hand out of the water.
KD responded by touching SP’s hand. SP did not react, and KD then grabbed her
hand. SP responded by continuing the game a total of seven times (see
supplementary video clip 1). No communicative gestures were recorded during
the game but as soon as it was interrupted the infant generated the gestural
signals grab and touch. This game was also instigated three times with ML, who
also used the gestures grab and touch as soon as the game was interrupted.
Social Game 2, ‘‘Object-Splash’’
This game occurred between SP, the infant KD, and a round, hard
Makalakonki fruit. The interaction started when SP lifted the fruit out of the
TABLE I. Communicative Gestures Produced by
Different Bonobo Individuals Before and After Disruption of Triadic Social 
Games
Beg Signaler outstretches her right or left hand with palm facing up
toward the recipient.
Grab Signaler takes hold of the recipient with the whole hand; fingers are
bent.
Head bob Signaler bows the head up and down toward the recipient.
Offer Signaler extends her arm with an object in her hand and holds it in
front of recipient.
Palm open and close Signaler outstretches her right or left hand with the inside facing
sideways while opening and closing the hand.
Protruded lips Signaler sticks out her lips and upends her upper lip; the teeth are
visible.
Touch Signaler does a gentle and short (o5 sec) contact using her flat
hands, body part or feet.
Stomp with foot Signaler brings the sole or heel suddenly and forcibly against or
upon the ground, object, or walks in a pounding manner.
Wiggle leg Signaler shakes the lower extremities from side to side in front of the
recipient.
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water and let it drop, producing a splash in the direction of KD. The floating
fruit was retrieved by KD, carried to SP, and offered to her. SP took it and
repeated the procedure. Again, KD went off to retrieve and offer the fruit to SP.
The game was repeated four times until KD started interacting with a conspecific.
KD only produced communicative gestures (offer) as soon as the game was
interrupted.
Social Game 3, ‘‘Fruit-Ball’’
This game was observed on two different occasions between CP, the bonobo
male KW, and a grapefruit. It started with KW playing with two grapefruits while
facing CP through the wired mesh of the enclosure door. KW pushed both fruits
through the door mesh, joggled, and rolled them on the ground. Accidentally, one
fruit rolled out of reach. CP initiated an interaction by rolling it back. KW played
with it, but then lost it again. Again, CP rolled it back. KW joggled it around,
pulled it into the enclosure, and pushed it out with two feet, this time letting it
roll to CP. Then CP and KW rolled the fruit back and forth repeatedly. Suddenly
CP stopped the game, and joggled the fruit in front of KW. KW looked at CP and
used different gestures (beg, stomp against the door, head bob, palm open and
close, protruded lips) until CP rolled the fruit back. The game went on for 10 min,
interrupted two more times by CP. Each time KW looked at CP and subsequently
used the gestures head bob, palm open and close, protruded lips, stomp, palm open
and close to reinstate the game (see supplemental video clip 2). In addition, the
game was interrupted twice by other group members who tried to get the fruit or
wanted to play with KW. KW played shortly with them, always protecting the
fruit. Both times he returned and restarted the game with CP by rolling the fruit
to him.
Social Game 4, ‘‘Object-Throw’’
This game was observed on 3 different days between the bonobo LS, the
human playmate AK, and a nut. LS found a nut in the sand of the enclosure,
stuck her hands through the door mesh and spontaneously threw it to AK. AK
handed it back and LS threw it back to her. This time AK also threw it back to LS.
After a few more iterations, AK suddenly stopped the game. LS first looked at her
then performed a variety of gestures (wiggle her leg, beg; see supplemental video
clip 3). Suddenly she found a different object, a yellow cap, and restarted the game
by throwing it to AK. AK threw the nut back, but LS now preferred the cap. When
AK stopped the game again, LS used different gestures (wiggle her leg, protruded
lips, beg). Then AK restarted the game throwing back the yellow cap. On the
second occasion, AK threw the cap, and LS threw it back. Then AK stopped the
interaction and LS performed the gestures protruded lips and beg. Other animals
then interrupted the game. On the third occasion, AK and LS played with a nut
again. When AK stopped the game, LS wiggled her leg and protruded the lips. AK
continued to play more rounds and then stopped the game again. This time LS
used the gestures beg and protruded her lips.
DISCUSSION
We described four different social games played by four bonobos interacting
with human playmates and different objects. Our observations showed that
bonobos readily engaged in these kinds of triadic games, by playing different but
complementary, interdependent, and parallel roles. These observations are in line
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with previous observations in some nonprimate animals, particularly dolphins
[e.g. Kuczaj & Highfill, 2005] and dogs [e.g. Mitchell & Thompson, 1993]. Similar
observations have been described for primates, but they were anecdotal and
restricted to language-trained and/or human-raised apes, who received extensive
training [e.g. Crawford, 1937; Gomez & Martin-Andrade, 2002; Matevia et al.,
2002]. The bonobos of this study used gestures in a flexible way to achieve a social
goal, namely to reengage a suddenly passive partner. Our results contrast with a
recent comparative study on children and chimpanzees [Warneken et al., 2006].
In that study, upon encountering a reluctant partner, the chimpanzees
immediately switched from a superficially social action to an individual attempt
or complete disengagement. Contrarily, children tried to reorient the experi-
menter toward the game and his part in the cooperative interaction [Warneken
et al., 2006]. The authors suggested that the children, but not the chimpanzees,
had learned to form with others a joint goal and joint intentions for reaching that
goal. Importantly, the chimpanzee results were used to argue in favor of a
fundamental cognitive difference between humans and primates in terms of the
ability to share intention. Our study suggests that it may be premature to draw
firm conclusions about an animal–human difference in this cognitive domain. We
are less pessimistic also because (a) in other paradigms chimpanzees have been
observed to use communicative gestures to solicit reluctant partners [e.g.
Crawford, 1937; Hirata & Fuwa, 2007]; (b) gorillas have been observed to initiate
triadic games with humans [e.g. Gomez & Martin-Andrade, 2002]; and (c)
dog–human play may fulfill criteria for shared intentionality outlined before
[Mitchell & Thompson, 1993]. However, attempts at reengaging a reluctant
partner are only one observational criterion for shared intentionality, and may
not represent the right tools to elucidate the underlying psychological processes.
In addition, it might be argued that the described games may be familiar or
ritualized between the bonobos and their human caretakers, suggesting that their
behavior was the outcome of simple operant conditioning processes. We do not
think that this is a valid interpretation because the object-splash and object-throw
games were spontaneously invented and most likely novel to the infants. It could
also be argued that the bonobos used the human playmates as simple tools to
restart interesting events, rather than perceiving them as partners in a joint
activity with a shared goal. Although this interpretation seems plausible for the
games played by the infants, it is more difficult to defend in the case of the object-
throw and fruit-ball game played by the older individuals, in which both
participants behaved as if they had joint and complementary goals. Crucially, the
bonobos were not interested in gaining possession of the objects per se, but they
used them to enable a joint social activity.
In sum, the bonobos’ performance in these cooperative interactions
resembled those of human children [e.g. Ratner & Bruner, 1978] and, following
Bratman [1992], showed two crucial criteria for shared intentionality: the
partners were mutually responsive to one another; and together they were
pursuing a shared goal, the social game. Children may go a step further by
coordinating their plans of action and joint intentions to allow role reversal. This
requires that both participants understand and jointly attend to both roles of the
interaction and implies a true understanding of communicative intentions: to
help the other with the complementary role. The communicative attempts of the
bonobos to restart the game seem to provide evidence that they understood and
attended to both roles of the game, although they never attempted to take on the
role of the human playmate, perhaps pointing to a crucial difference between apes
and humans.
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